Venezuela and the Bolivarian Revolution
Notes from a visit 27 November – 6th December 2006

“the United States of North Ameriis destined by providence to plague the people of the Americas with hunger and misery in the name of freedom.”
Simon Bolivar, 1825

“We will not rest until we break the chains that oppress our people, the chains of hunger, misery and colonialism. This country will be free, or we will die trying to free it.” Hugo Chavez, 1994

Report of Mark Langhammer on the Chavez led Bolivarian Revolution.

December’s Venezuelan presidential election sawnthe incumbent President, Hugo Chavez re-elected by a long distance. Chavez won 62.89% of the vote ahead of his main rival, Manuel Rosales. The poll represents a stunning blow to the US backed opposition.

In the week preceeding the election, Caracas was a lively city. Large street rallies were held, invariably good natured, with a sea of red shirts, caps, berets, bandanas and wristbands - latin american salsa music to the fore, and a carnival atmosphere prevailing.

The vibrancy and energy on show was like no European election. Touring a range of polling stations across Caracas - in both “Chavista” and opposition territories - the long queues at polling booths were orderly. Turn out was high at 75%.

The electronic voting system worked well, public transport was free on election day, and the two day pre-poll electioneering embargo (and alcohol sales embargo) aimed at reducing street tensions, seemed to be largely respected.

Arriving in Caracas, immediate impressions were of a very poor society. Basic shanties (“ranchos”) clinging to the hill slopes, with poor or non existent water supply, we passed broken down, or overheated cars (like Cuba, cars are kept on the road for 40 or more years – and street mechanics abound) leading to an untidy city thick with the fumes of diesel and oil. Some excellent modern infrastructure, such as the city Metro sits side by side third world conditions.

Without a comprehensive social welfare system, a vibrant street selling culture abounds. A brand conscious, fashion conscious and beautiful people, often wedded to a globalist consumer culture, contrasted with a people and society asserting its independence, alive to the threats of US imperialism and dangers of neo-liberalism.

Our immediate thoughts were on how a country so rich in oil and gas, with vast hydro-electric potential, with a climate supporting a lucrative coffee crop, grass that the cattle would die for, and trees laiden heavy with fruit could have so much of its population living in dire poverty, with workers earning $5 or$10 dollars a day?

Our delegation had a hectic programme of events, many laid on by Venezuela Solidarity, and by MvR (Movement for the Fifth Republic) National Assembly member, Augusto Medina Montiel. We spoke on national radio and toured the new Latin American Vive TV channel. We met senior economic official, Haiman El Troudi (a former chief of staff to Chavez) hearing his progressive ideas on the developing vision of “Socialism in the 21st Century” – neither state socialist nor neo liberal.

Another highlight was a forensic lecture from lawyer Eva Golinger on the background and history of US efforts to destabilize the administration, based on her Freedom of Information searches and her books, “Breaking the Chavez Code” (2004) and “Chavez versus Bush” (2006).

From literacy projects to self employment preparation, from neighbourhood soup kitchens, to the Co-Op food Mercals, the Bolivarian Revolution has activated a layer of the poorest in Venezuelan society.

The result has been a popular, empowering and humane vision - with a highly politicized, involved and active and increasingly organized civic society. As someone involved in political life for over 20 years it is without question, the most inspirational and practical development that I have ever witnessed. Encouragingly it is also free of dogma or hectoring ideological language.

Venezuelan Politics 1958-98
The political system in Venezuela from 1958 to 1998 was nominally democratic. The two main parties were the hegemonic Accion Democratica (which could be loosely termed as Social Democrats) and Copei (Christian Democrats). Through the pact of Punto Fijo both sought to limit opportunity for other political groupings and alternate power between them.

Both had vast memberships, as joining was a means of getting on, getting influence or getting a job. Accion Democratica, in particular, enjoyed cosy relations with the Confederacion de Trabajadores Venezolanos (CTV) union movement (which in part, was funded through the American Federation of Labour (AFLCIO).

Equally, the civil service bureaucracy in the Ministries, ossified under this regime, would be largely comfortable with the status quo and resistant to change.

In the 1960’s and 70’s the governments undertook significant infrastructural improvements, but the mass of a poor society were largely disengaged from political life. The economy slumped in the 80’s and was subjected to brutal neo-liberal reforms which sharply affected the poorest.

The 1989 ‘Caracazo’ saw thousands of poor people in spontaneous protest at the overnight doubling of bus fares and food prices. The ‘Caracazo’ was met with a brutal and murderous response from the military, who were ordered to fire on protestors. The ‘Caracazo’ also saw the beginnings of a fusion of leftist, anti-imperialist and other forces.

Chavez’s rise was linked to the gradual politicization and mobilization of a vast ‘underclass’ of the excluded. A Chavez led coup in 1992 failed, but Chavez, taking full responsibility for the coup in a TV appeal to his colleagues to down arms, had caught the imagination of a public at its tether end..

Following the Presidential impeachment in 1993, Chavez was released from jail by the incoming President, Perez, in 1994, and set about building a national movement in a bid to achieve election as President in 1998.

Since being elected in 1998, a new Constitution has been popularly endorsed in 1999 which, together with the subsequent “49 laws” serves as the legal basis of the Bolivarian revolution. He has been met with trenchant, if ill advised, opposition including a Coup d’Etat in April 2002, a ‘bosses strike’ or ‘lock out’ in December 2002 and January 2003, a recall referendum in 2004 and a boycott of the National Assembly in 2005.

With each threat, the most impoverished sections of Venezuelan society have come onto the streets to defend ‘their’ President and, with it, deepen their own democratic participation. Decentralization, and popular participation is explicitly recognized in the 1999 constitution.

Two things strike me about the Chavez development. First, its sovereign attitude to both land and the hydrocarbon wealth of the country. Second, the outstanding political factor in Venezuela’s “slow burn” Bolivarian Revolution is the degree to which power has been devolved to workplaces and communities – and to the poorest and most excluded in society. The politicization of this vast and poor layer of society has been the key to Hugo Chavez’s popularity.

Oil and the Economy
It would be wrong to portray Venezuela as a socialist paradise, or Chavez as a saviour. What is happening in Venezuela is, however, a practical, pragmatic and empowering “slow burn” revolution. One of the most illuminating meetings we had was with Haiman El Troudi (a former chief of staff to Chavez) He indicated that the ideological principles of the initial Chavez government were ‘national’ and populist, but non-authoritarian and enabling, based initially on the 10 principles of the 1995 Bolivarian declaration.

The initial thinking of Chavez was “3rd way”. He had talks with both Blair and Schroder, and saw merit in both Scandinavian social democracy and German co-determination in the workplace. Early activity to promote OPEC as a more disciplined entity paid dividends, as has the rising price of oil internationally.

It should be noted, however, that Chavez did not hold real power over the oil company, the PDVSA, until after the 2002/03 “lock out” or “bosses strike” after which thousands of oil workers were sacked for backing an Opposition led and overtly political strike aimed at overthrowing the democratically elected government. Thereafter, the oil wealth has been redirected towards social, health and education projects and PDVSA adverts on state television regularly boast of these social projects.

The PDVSA is one of a small number of strategic industrial sectors (others include gas, hydro electric and electricity) recognised at essential to the state. These are unionised industries, where workers’ control measures are more limited.

Within the oil sector, the PDVSA and the state estimate a fair stabilisation price for oil, anything above which goes to a macro-economic fund, which in turn channels funds into both infrastructural projects and to the Fonda Unico Social (Social Fund) Funding from the PDVSA has, in part, been a tool to bypass the institutions of state – the civil service and ministries, which, in the view of El Troudi, have ossified under the previous regimes and were “obstructive” to change of the sort envisaged by Chavez.

El Troudi described the core of Bolivarianism, following the endorsement of the Constitution, as the 49 enabling laws, but in particular the two laws relating to land and hydrocarbons. The sovereign attitude to land and hydrocarbons adopted by the Chavez administration is what appears to have offended the bourgeois interest. Agrarian land reform has antagonised some rich landowners.

It sets limits on the size of landholdings, taxes underutilised land and property, redistributes un-used government land and can vest fallow land (private or public) for the purpose of redistribution and development by food production co-operatives. Much of the agrarian reforms are based on securing a strategic food supply in case of future embargo from the US or others, underlined by food shortages over the 2002-03 “lock out”.

El Troudi considered that foreign, media, opposition and insider infiltration led to the 2002 coup. Chavez had, to a degree, “taken his eye off the ball” Following street resistance to the coup, however, he has now successfully reconnected with populist opinion.

The movement towards socialism was gradual and experiental – culminating in “Socialism for the 21st Century” in 2006 – the platform for 2007 onwards will be in implementing this – a doctrine of neither statism, nor totalitarianism. At its core is the notion of ‘endogenous’ growth – growth “from within”, based on ‘what’s there’.

El Troudi said that the administration was mindful of high level of importation, even in foodstuffs, and of “unacceptable consumption patterns”. He pragmatically acknowledged that changing minds on brand culture, the lure of consumerism and, in particular, individualist car culture would be difficult.

El Troudi also described an interesting attitude to Foreign and Direct Investment (FDI) which was to be welcomed, but responsibly “hosted”. The Government, he said, had looked at a set of FDI hosting principles, with government requiring a company agreement on a reasonable level of profit, with “quid pro quo” requirements for workers’ shares, forms of industrial democracy, practical Corporate Social Responsibility (such as building local schools), and local supply chain management (to tackle the black economy).

Based on such principles, the state can support companies through loans, incentives, tax breaks and judicial guarantees. An example of this approach was a partnership with Norwegian company, Statoil. The strategic focus is not primarily development, growth or profits per se, but “the integral development of the human being.”

It should be noted, however, that although the administration is redistributing oil revenue in programmes for the poorest, the basic structure of the economy has not been radically altered. Venezuela’s wealthy classes, though perhaps paying their due in taxes more than before, have remained largely untouched. Conspicuous consumption was noticeable, particularly the high volume of 4X4 Sports Utility Vehicles on the road.

In a markedly “territorial” city, the wealthy lived their separate, cultured lives freely, their political irresponsibility and distain for the public sphere not unlike that of the Ulster Protestant middle classes. On the evidence of a short visit, nobody at the top is getting squeezed too much.

Empowering the people
To someone from Belfast, the sight of politicized grass roots “barrios” (neighbourhoods) was not strange. The degree to which democratic decision making has taken root from the top to bottom of society was hard to wholly assess in a short visit.

A lot of people seemed to be involved in the Missions and in political or neighbourhood work of some sort. Without the “dole” the small training allowances would be incentive of sorts in the Missions work. However, developing people and organisational power was seen as a conscious means of defending a democratic revolution, under constant threat from US inspired opposition, internal and external.

Politics in Venezuela has a “territorial” feel to it. The MVR, in particular, encourage very localised electoral “battle units” at neighbourhood level. Street rallies had a “zonal” quality readily recognizable to a Belfast visitor. Amongst the “barrio” projects visited included community consejos, social Missions and urban land committees.

There were also localised committees for water, gas and other infrastructural works. The activity of the Land Committes, the Missions and the Consejos give a reasonable representation of the “bottom up” approach being attempted.

Land Committees
After the Presidential decree of 4 February 2002 the Urban Land Committees (Comites de Tierra Urbanes, or CTUs) were authorized and have been set up in almost every “barrio” in Venezuela.

Crowded, chaotic and often without water or electricity, the ranchos (shanties) are often poorly built on unsafe hillside land – prone to destruction in heavy rain. By grouping 100 or 200 families to form a CTU, the poor shanty dwellers can, through the Office of Urban Land Tenancy and Regularization, regularize their ownership.

This simple solution allows people to invest in their properties and seek grant aid for water, electric, gas and other communal improvements. The process has brought millions into active civil society, with 5.7 million dwellers represented in CTUs.

Consejos Communales
Equally, the formation of Communal Councils (Consejos communales) has been supported by the Ministry for Popular Participation, with Fonda Comun set up as an organization to fund projects decided upon by the consejos. Over 16,000 consejos have been set up within a year. In forming a consejo the community must first undertake a basic census or local survey, then must reach consensus on a collective history of its area.

Chavez himself is very keen to pursue the capture of oral histories as a means of deepening historical awareness. This process is like a communal Wilkipedia process, pooling individuals memories of events to create a collective narrative. The Constitutional basis of the consejos – whose General Assembly (rather than spokesperson) is sovereign - has empowered neighbourhoods with high levels of legal awareness.

The basic idea is “Not from Above”. Freddie Bernal (Mayor of the Liberador municipalite in central Caracas where we visited the barrio St Augustin) said that the Community Council “is a basic cell of the future society”.

All those I spoke to spoke highly of the way the ‘process’ of community development had helped them as people, through the educative power of governance.

When the consejos develop their priorities, they can implement these with funding through Fonda Comun. Typically, projects are practical – such as community gas supply, drainage, cultural development and so on.

Larger projects can be done in collaboration with other consejos, or at barrio level or at municipality level, depending on the scale, skills and complexity involved. The consejos were also highly independent, of the Chavez regime or other political poles – and act as a bulwark against authoritarian central government tendencies.

The Missions
As mentioned, the PDVSA has now started to fund a range of social ‘Missions’. There is obvious pride in the Missions within poor areas. They are a bit like “schemes” in Britain, but without the negative connotations. They are looked on as a positive contribution, rather than as a palliative to long term unemployment. Empowering, rather than “shut up” money.

The Robinson Mission has sought to tackle illiteracy with millions passing through the programme and UNESCO declaring Venezuela free of illiteracy in early 2006. The Ribas Mission tackles high school drop-out, with the Sucre Mission overseeing the largest expansion in higher and university education every seen in the state.

The Mercal Mission was set up in the wake of the 2002 lock out when there were widespread food shortages. The Mercals are “Co-op” shops selling a limited range of staple foods – flour, rice, pasta etc – to guarantee food supply from future attempts at bosses lock outs.

The Zamora Mission aims to hand back land titles to farmers and farming Co-ops to guarantee food for the “have-nots” The Guaicaipuro Mission aims to restore human rights to numerous indigenous communities as well as economic development, land demarcation, strengthening identity, language, education, habitat and health.

The Cultural Mission is a new form of university system with participants graduating as Teachers in Culture. The newest Mission is Negra Hipolita aimed at tackling poverty and social exclusion.

The Vuelvar (or “Back to Work”)
Mission prepares people for employment, self employment or work within the Co-operatives The number of Co-operatives has increased from 800 in 1998 to over 100,000 today with over 1,500,000 Venezuelans working in Co-ops.

Oly Millan, Venezuela’s Minister for Popular Economy stresses a humane economic vision, one of putting quality of life and solidarity above profit. “The primary purpose of the co-operatives is not to turn a profit, but to realize the potential of the country, create networks of productivity and improve quality of life. The state is a non invasive facilitator.”

One of the most effective Missions is Barrio Adentra –setting up of small medical centres in barrios, with a doctor, optician and health worker serving some 250 families (3000-3500 population – the extended family is still a strong feature). An influx of Cuban doctors and medical specialists have been at the core of Mission barrio Adentra, with thousands of Venezuelans going to Cuba to train as their replacements.

The Missions are seen as a “special lift up” to poor sections of society which have been undertaken directly, by the grass roots and through volunteerism by way of subverting a civil service bureaucracy opposed to change.

Time and again we heard from activists resentful at the irresponsible nature of an ossified state bureaucracy, variously either obstructively oppositionist, or just locked into the old ways of the former regimes. Nowhere was this more demonstrated than in education.

Education
We met with Damelyn Yeguez, an Education sub secretary of one of the Caracas municipalities, near Barrio 23 January, a redoubtable radical area.
“Unions behaved very poorly. Teaching staff were and are actively involved in the Opposition. Many played a leading role in the embargo” She referred to the US funded Asamblea de Education, whose leader Leonardo Carvajal was a trenchant opponent. The Catholic Church, which runs many schools, is a formal part of the Opposition movement.

Responsible for 94 schools at primary and secondary level, Yeguez said that Mayors were given a role in Education in 2000, as the municipalities could be better relied upon to reflect more accurately the needs of society as a whole.

“Amongst the problems we have inherited are the quality of learning, low enrolments, the poor conditions of school buildings and the health of the children. In addition the content of education had little emphasis on reflecting local, national and Latin American culture and history.”

In response, the municipality has tackled problems in a number of ways. Opening “Bolivarian” schools was one way. Over 1500 Bolivarian schools have been opened across Venezuela in neighbourhoods with traditionally little access to quality education. A new “Bolivarian” curriculum has been introduced. With population growth, a new schooling system is growing round the old.

A programme to retire older teachers is underway, with newly trained “Interns” (3 year contracted teachers) coming in. An emphasis on local soup kitchens and on quality school dinners has underlined better nutrition at the heart of education - with further plans for school sports programmes and school educational trips.

One of the most successful interventions has been a system of insurance, linked to attendance, for children providing death cover, funeral and other costs, accident and major health cover.
The Education system illustrated well how a popular administration is driving its reforms through and around an entrenched bureaucracy.

The Media
With four of the five Venezuelan TV channels privately owned and virulently anti-Chavista, only the single state station can give reasoned coverage to government affairs. On the national channel, political debate was long and intense. One debate I watched, between Chavez and four opposition journalists, lasted for 3 hours – not a soundbite in sight.

The behaviour of the private media is openly hostile, with little pretence at balance. At times, in the absence of adequate political leadership of a disparate opposition, the private media have appeared to ‘be’ the opposition. A new station, Vive, operates across South America as a sort of Latin “Al Jazeera” – funded by Venezuelan oil. There has been an explosion of community media, radio, web and print – highly localized and often assisted by local small business.

The community media give voice to a range of groups and members of the community – talk shows, educational programming, cooking shows, music programmes including salsa, hip-hop, bolero, rock and llanero or country music. Other current affairs and political programmes make visible issues like race, rarely tackled elsewhere.

In the community media, there have been sharp exchanges between the ANMCLA (National Association of Alternative and Community Media) and the administration’s CONATEL (the National Commission of Telecommunications) on regulatory issues governing community media - with community radio, in particular, fiercely protecting its critical independence

Unions
Under the previous AD/Copei regimes, Accion Democratica, in particular, enjoyed cosy relations with the Confederacion de Trabajadores Venezolanos (CTV) union movement (which in part, was funded through the American Federation of Labour (AFLCIO). The CTV is now largely discredited, claiming to represent some 12% of Venezuelan workers.

A new and rival union movement, the Union Nationale Trabajadores has emerged which- whilst not necessarily overtly Chavista - accepts and works within Venezuelan Constitution and democracy. UNT would have supported Chavez, nonetheless, in the Presidential election.

It should be noted that the TUC has established fraternal relations with UNT, rather than CTV. My impressions were that the UNT was not, as yet, well organized and was prone to ideological dispute. The attitude of the MVR and Chavistas generally appeared to be that they had historical difficulties with unions, and that union organization (and attachment to adversarial methods in the workplace) sat uneasily with both workers control in the workplace.

Trade union activism also sat uneasily with the neighbourhood basis of political organization. Unions were recognized in the1999 Constitution, and no ill will was afforded to bona fide trade unionism. I got the impression that the Chavez view was not anti union, but was uninterested in the ideological disputation that characterizes them, and was not going to waste too much time fixing the unions as a going concern.

Chavez
The Chavez factor is important. Chavez is a highly effective and charismatic communicator, at once evangelical and caring - a man with a “big heart”, someone who has touched a very deep well of need.

The son of two teachers, modestly raised, he graduated from the military academy and became a paratrooper, then a highly regarded trainer in the military academy. His regular (sometimes long winded) appearances on national television demonstrate well his pedagogical talent. He is a born teacher!

His Movement for the Bolivarian Revolution (MBR), set up in 1982, was an oathbound military grouping working for civilian and military collaboration in the overthrow of a corrupt regime. Chavez is from the socialist camp for sure, but reaches way beyond factions and party formations. Marta Harnecker notes that “the great merit of Chavez is that he is a leader who promotes popular organization, he is open and direct.”

His appeal is only recently overtly socialist, but is primarily national - or Bolivarian. The Bolivarian Revolution sees US imperialism and neo-liberalism of corporate multi-nationals as the source of many of Venezuela’s ills.

Bolivar’s 1825 prediction that “the United States of North America is destined by providence to plague the people of the Americas with hunger and misery in the name of freedom” chimes well with Chavez’s desire to staunch the flow of produce and wealth previously funneled by a privileged elite to the banks of London, New York and Geneva.

He preaches national sovereignty, Latin American solidarity and unity and has broached the issue of a Latin American NATO and a single regional currency and will work for a restoration of the 18th Century Gran Columbia (Columbian, Venezuela, Equador unity), linking with Cuba, Argentina and Brazil to form a bulwark against neo-liberal and USA interference (of which there is plenty).

The manner in which he has connected and activated previously disengaged and impoverished sections of society - the indigenous peoples, the companeros (small farmers, 10,000 of whom rode on horseback through Caracas last year in support of Chavez) and women in society that has made the difference.

Chavez is of mixed race, and looks discernably indigenous. A rarely spoken race hate by the wealthy and white settler class goes some way to explaining the fear felt for the Chavez administration (the economic interests of the wealthy have been left largely untouched).

Repeated US backed efforts to destabilize this very democratic, grass roots development are lavishly funded. In view of covert US efforts to destabilize the elected government, that Chavez is a military man has helped secure robust counter intelligence efforts.

The importance of Chavez to the Bolivarian development is considerable – to the extent that political assassination is a live threat (as the recent discovery of a Columbian plot to kill Chavez demonstrates). The danger of over-reliance on Chavez is a danger to the long term health of the Bolivarian revolution – one which the muted Constitutional referendum to allow Chavez to serve more than 2 six year terms do not address.

Miltary Civic Co-operation
Another interesting effort has been the effort to get the military to use spare capacity to assist community efforts – a key plank of the Chavez programme. Under the Plan Bolivar, the military are deepening their involvement in local projects, building works, land and farm reclamation and other community efforts.

There is a palpable difference in the way that ordinary Venezuelans view the federal military in a more relaxed manner than the police, who are under municipal control. There appears to be movement the other way too, with the military training of community defence units in guerrilla warfare muted by several we met, in the event of any future US inspired invasion.

I did not get a sufficient account of this activity to write with any authority, but such activity would be a basic and prudent step in view of US activity to undermine Chavez.

Threats to the Bolivarian Revolution
Until 1998 Venezuela was a most submissive player to US policy, with the US on the verge of being the principal benefactor of efforts to privatize Venezuela’s lucrative oil industry. Then came Chavez, paving the way for Venezuelan oil wealth to benefit the mass of Venezuelan society for the first time.

The terrible crime of the Chavez administration, earning it to be branded within (along with Cuba) the Latin American “axis of evil” and listed on the US “terrorist watch” along with North Korea and Iran, is that it is engaged, however modestly, in redistributing wealth to a very poor people. Chavez’s economic policy is moderate - at best social democratic – but hardly revolutionary.

What has raised high alert in Washington is Chavez’s key role in revitalizing the Organisation for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) along with Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qutar, Libya, Indonesia, Algeria and Nigeria, (as well as establishing strong ties with non OPEC producers such as Norway). That Chavez maintained links with Cuba, undermining the 40 year US embargo, is another key Washington concern.

Crude US attempts to simply arrange for or support the overthrow of inconvenient foreign regimes – such as happened in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, Congo in 1960, the Bay of Pigs in 1961, Brazil in 1964 and Vietnam has given way to more ‘subtle’ tactics of “democratic intervention”. Subsequent US activity in Venezuela has followed the template of 1980’s Nicaragua in intervening in electoral processes, or that of Chile (1970’s) and Haiti (1990’s) of regime change by coup d’Etat.

Since coming to power in 1998, Chavez has had to counter serious and constant efforts to destabilize the administration. These have included a (briefly successful) coup d’Etat in April 2002, a bosses strike or “lock out” in Winter 2002/03, the Guarimba “recall” referendum in 2004, an opposition boycott of the National Assembly elections in 2005, along with backing trenchant opposition from the private sector dominated media, as well as ‘blind eye’ toleration of the assassination threat of Columbian and Miami based terror hubs. The assassination of National Prosecutor Daniel Anderson is seen as the tip of a large iceberg.

At every turn, these efforts have been met with increased democratic support for the Chavez administration and an entrenched will on the part of Venezuela’s “have nots” to defend their Bolivarian Revolution.

Although relations with the Clinton administration were frosty, the programme of US destabilization only accelerated under the Bush regime. Key to US efforts have been the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), who’s current annual budget to “promote democracy” in Venezuela is currently over $1,000,000 and USAID, which has a $5,000,000 budget.

All funds support active opponents of the democratically elected government, with not one cent, penny or Bolivar going to any group remotely sympathetic to the Chavez regime. US support for “promoting democracy” is a one way street.

The NED operates by funding a number of “Core Grantees” – effectively “intermediate funding bodies”. These include, the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the American Centre for International Labour Solidarity (ACILS) and the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE).

IRI is a far right wing grouping headed by the Republican Presidential front runner candidate John McCain, a key defender of the global “war on terror”. The NDI is headed up by leading Democrat, Madeleine Albright.

IRI and NDI represent Republican and Democratic party channels to disparate foreign aid recipients – a sort of “horses for courses” strategy. ACILS has ensured funding and links with the Confederacion de Trabajadores Venezolanos (CTV, an anti Chavez trade union movement linked with the former AD and Copei regimes).

CIPE has had a track record in shaping the aggressive, neo-liberal “good economic development” policies of Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

These in turn fund a veritable array of political organizations and parties including Primero Justicia, Proyecto Venezuela and the left wing MAS, as well as the discredited former governing parties – Copei and AD. Polling organizations such as Sumate are funded to shape public opinion.

Media and broadcasting organizations (Instituto Prensa y Sociedad), educational groups (Asamblea de Educacion), business confederations (Fedecamaras), and ACSC (Civic Alliance of Civil Society) are all funded to foment discontent. Accion Campesina has been funded to provoke rural opposition to the Chavez land reforms. Funding to opposition groupings, in every corner of civil society, have helped prevent the Bolivarian development of Chavez from being allowed to settle down.

Internal opposition to Chavez has been characterized by division and ineptitude. US aid has been integral to shaping the opposition to the Chavez administration and ensuring its convergence to back a single anti-Chavez election candidate. This resulted in a creditable “papering over the cracks” presidential election campaign from Manuel Rosales, a wealthy cattle rancher. However, Rosales polled only 36% to Chavez’s increased 62.89%.

Given that massive US funding has only produced increased politicization and awareness amongst the Chavez regime and grass roots, it can only be assumed that a more direct approach by the US is being contemplated. Whilst “regime change”, assassination or invasion may be on the cards, the Bush regime is hampered by both internal US politics and by external priorities such as Iraq, Afghanistan and the “spectre” of Iran. Circumstances have been helpful to Chavez.

A bewildering and complicated picture of US aid to bolster opposition to the Chavez regime has been charted by a brave young US/Venezuean attorney, Eva Golinger. Her books “The Chavez Code” (2004) and “Bush vs Chavez” (2006) list an horrific catalogue of interference by the US in Venezuelan affairs.

The full detail of Golinger’s investigations (and she considers that she has only exposed the tip of a very large iceberg) can be read at www.venezuelafoia.info Golinger, unsurprisingly, lives under constant threat of death.

How far the Bush administration is prepared to go to remove what Condaleeza Rice described as “a real problem” for the region remains to be seen.

Venezuelan Electronic Voting
One impressive feature of the Venezuelan election was the independence of the National Electoral Commission and its system of electronic voting.
The Consejo National Electoral (CNE) is the Electoral Commission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, which organizes and supervises everything related to popular elections by way of universal direct and secret voting.

It can organize the election of trade unions and civilian organizations on request. It regulate electoral laws and resolves doubts or problems resulting from any omissions within these laws. It can apply sanctions when laws have not been followed and is able to declare null and void any election, either totally or partially.

The Consejo is appointed by the National Assembly following a public appointment process. From some 200 non party political applicants, 5 were chosen by consensus of all parties in the Assembly.

A feature of the Venezuelan electoral system is its use of an electronic voting system. Voters are initially verified by a fingerprint swipe (Venezuela has a national fingerprint database). Then, by a process similar to an ATM transaction, the voter chooses his/her chosen candidate. The voter then confirms his/her choice, and a paper ballot is printed out. The voter puts the paper ballot in a ballot box, which forms a verification “paper trail” for the system.

The computer network at each polling station is disconnected from any telephony system, to guard against the prospect of hacking.
At the end of voting, an electronic tally is taken. An agreed statistical sample is taken from the paper ballot box and, if verified, the system is connected to the internet and sent to central electoral HQ.

The system is not contentious, largely because the computer coding for the open source software on which the system is based is available on the internet for scrutiny by the computer wonks of any and all interested parties.

This is in contrast to the private sector developed system developed in the US and elsewhere (including Ireland) where the code is considered privately owned “intellectual property” – reducing overall confidence.

Voting is slow, with voters taking 4 to 5 hours in queues at polling stations.
Other factors of interest in Venezuelan elections are a two day embargo on campaigning in the days before the election. Equally, there is a three day ban on public sales of alcohol. Both measures are aimed at reducing tensions and appear to be largely respected.

Conclusion
Overall, the Bolivarian Revolution is a highly encouraging development, but a “work in progress” Its spirit is one of popular involvement and localized organization.

Although the high levels of active participation may dip over time, the humane philosophy underpinning the economic and social development of a “rich, poor” country is highly commendable. As an alternative to neo-liberalism, it is venturing in a positive direction, travelling in hope, largely free of dogma and content to face hurdles and ‘events’ in a pragmatic frame.

How “revolutionary” is the Bolivarian development? Although the means of production is still largely in private hands, strategic state enterprises, and significant numbers of smaller co-operatives are tilting at that balance. Hosting principles for foreign investment are yet to be proven, but worth trying. Creating a significant sphere of economic activity not given over to the aim of private profit is a good start.

The state has been an active player in redistributing state wealth – although hasn’t greatly interfered with private wealth. Venezuela has opposed the various US promoted “Free Trade” agreements and have instead entered a range of trading agreements based on reciprocity, oil for doctors (with Cuba), oil for cows, and software (with Uruguay), oil for city technology in waste and traffic management (with London).

Similar agreements exist with Argentina, and Ecuador. This non market trade emphasizes solidarity and co-operation over competition and moves in a useful direction. The extent of the scale on which this could be undertaken remains an open question.

The system of government itself, freed up by massive oil revenues, has been able to avoid the sway and influence of private capital. The use of the military for civic tasks loosens the propensity of the state to regulate capital. The “bottom up” popular involvement of citizenry has also helped to put “people first” rather than private capital.

Venezuela hasn’t broken free. It’s Bolivarian revolution is under constant threat. But it has chosen a very interesting and hopeful path.

Mark Langhammer is a National Executive member of the Irish Labour Party and was part of a joint Labour Party / ICTU delegation to study the political, economic and social effects of the Bolivarian Revolutuion. He can be contacted at
mlanghammer@dsl.pipex.com

Some further information

www.venezuelanalysis.com

www.venezuelafoia.info

Richard Gott: Chavez and the Bolivarian RevolutionHugo

Chavez tackles the “lunacy” of consumerism, “developmentalism” and car culture in Drawbridge Magazine, July 2006

Eva Golinger: The Chavez Code (ISBN959-09-0307-X) and “Bush vs Chavez (forthcoming) give a full account of US efforts to fund opposition political and civil society groups in Venezuela.

Marta Harnecker: Understanding the Venezuelan Revolution, 2005

Green Left www.greenleft.org.au has regular Venezuela articles.

Haiman El Troudi:
Michael Lebowitz: Socialism for the 21st Century